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ABSTRACT
It is common for end-users to have difficulty in using computer or network
security appropriately and thus have often been ridiculed when misinterpreting
instructions or procedures. This discussion paper details the outcomes of research
undertaken over the past six years on why security is overly complex for endusers. The results indicate that multiple issues may render end-users vulnerable to
security threats and that there is no single solution to address these problems.
Studies on a small group of senior citizens has shown that educational seminars
can be beneficial in ensuring that simple security aspects are understood and used
appropriately.
Keywords End-user, security usability, software usability, ADSL routers,
Internet Service Providers, cyber security, cyber safety
1. INTRODUCTION
The Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) (ABS, 2012) reported continued
growth of Internet subscribers, with almost twelve million active Internet
connections in Australia as of December, 2011. This trend is expected to be
extended through the Australian Government, National Broadband Network
(NBN) initiative. Australian consumers will have access to a high-speed Internet
connection, through either fibre optic cabling, or fixed wireless technologies
(DBCDE, 2011). The incentives for adopting an Internet connection are varied.
For the millennial generation social communication, gaming, and educational
resources are typically sourced online while baby boomers and baby busters may
have less of a need to access the Internet. However, live news, share trading,
banking, online shopping discounts, medical advice, entertainment and travel
resources provide significant incentives for all generations to have Internet access.
Unfortunately, the Internet has made it increasingly easy for individuals to use
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this medium for profiteering scams, fraud and online attacks. Whilst operating
system updates, anti-virus scanners, and personal firewalls reduce the probability
of successful attacks, to be effectively protected end-users must recognise their
importance, understand their functionality, and most importantly know how to
optimize the protection mechanisms’ potential. Moreover, sophisticated phishing
scams, conflicting opinions on ideal security software, and technical cyber
security jargon, have made it challenging for the average consumer to protect
themselves online. Government departments have taken it upon themselves to
create online portals (Get Safe Online, 2012; StaySmartOnline, 2010) with
detailed information for protecting end-users online. However, the content tends
to be limited, and does not address all aspects of online security in a rapidly
changing environment.
Opinion is divided on who should be responsible for the online protection of
novice end-users. Manufacturers continually enhance products and technologies
to help protect end-users from online threats; however some manufacturers,
professionals and academics believe that cyber security responsibility lies with the
individual (Phippen & Furnell, 2007). End-users must be well aware of the risks
and the potential outcomes, if sufficient cyber security is to be applied. Secondly,
the user must have the appropriate supporting information to guide them through
the implementation of the security process. Individuals are generally aware that
their home premises could be physically broken into, and as a result consider a
house alarm as one method of protection. Television, print and online media
promote the simplicity of how a wireless network could be broken into and used
to access or steal data (Seymour, 2010). However, simply highlighting the online
risks, without providing solutions, may not result in effective actions by the enduser to secure a wireless network.
The paper presents six years of accumulated research into identifying the
misconceptions and challenges that end-users face when attempting to utilise
security effectively. The research began with an attempt to determine what
prevents end-users from applying and using security. Figure 1 shows the
progression of the research activity from an initial anonymous survey of novice
end-users, which then lead to examining security manuals and undertaking
personalised face-to-face interviews. The consumer interviews specifically
identified that Internet Service Providers’ (ISP) employees may be at fault, which
initiated an ethics approved deceptive interview of ISP staff. The paper discusses
the security information supplied by ISPs online and the usability of internet
security software.
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Misconceived Perceptions:
Anonymous survey of 163 novice
end-users in 2006

Security Literature: Examination
of 17 ADSL router manuals 20062011

Misconceived Perceptions:
Face-to-face interviews of 23
novice end-users in 2009

ISPs and Insecurity: Deceptive
interviews of Australia’s ISPs in
2010

Usable Online Information:
Examination of ISP website
security content in 2010

Security Software Usability:
Examination of security software
usability in 2011

Figure 1 Timeline of Research Events
2. SECURITY CHALLENGES
In 2010, a two week study of 13 anti-virus vendors identified that on average each
vendor was able to detect and provide a solution, for only 90% of newly released
malware (Cyveillance, 2010). Vendors may often struggle to detect malware and
release signature updates, due to malware developers using anti-forensics and
anti-avoidance techniques (Brand, Valli & Woodward, 2010). Vendors were also
challenged by the 300% surge in newly released malware specimens throughout
2009 (ScanSafe, 2009). The statistics indicate the safety limitations to end-users
who purchase such software particularly as malware takes on new forms. Modern
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malware is targeting devices other than the traditional PC paradigm including;
Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line (ADSL) routers, smart phones and gaming
consoles (Čeleda, Krejčí, Vykopal, & Drašar, 2010; Symantec, 2009). The
malware specimen known as ‘psyb0t’ alone had the capability of infecting 55
types and models of ADSL routers, and had been pre-populated with 6000
usernames and 13000 passwords (Paul, 2009), yet consumers were generally
unaware of such threats with the worm’s attributes generally reserved for industry
professionals and academics.
Most current ADSL routers incorporate an 802.11 wireless access point; however
many are sold with the wireless access point pre-enabled. If the end-user has no
need for a wireless network, and does not manually switch off the feature, they
are providing access to their wireless signal in the immediate neighbourhood. An
open wireless network, coupled with Wi-Fi pineapples (Simpsons, 2012), can be
used by cyber criminals to intercept and capture private data. When an end-user
attempts to connect to their open wireless network, they would connect
unknowingly, through the Wi-Fi pineapple of a cyber criminal, who can capture
and misuse private data (Purvis, 2012). This is further problematic with local
governments and retailers in large cities providing free wireless internet access
(Hutchinson, 2012). Vendors typically promote the benefits of using a wireless
network, yet fail to highlight the dangers. Accordingly, an ill-informed end-user
could leave a wireless network unsecured.
3. MISCONCEIVED PERCEPTIONS
The millennial generation are encouraged to utilise the Internet to access a range
of services, with many retailers for instance offering incentives or discounts if
consumers purchase items or services online. Senior citizens or those who have
retired from work cannot easily escape the realm of online services. Traditionally,
they used a passbook to access their savings account but are now encouraged to
use the Internet for personal monetary transactions, unaware of the associated
risks (Cook, Szewczyk, & Sansurooah, 2011). Senior citizens who have created a
portfolio of savings may need to access or manage it through online systems.
Unfortunately, regardless of the age, qualifications and occupation, many endusers are unfamiliar with the associated security risks of using the Internet for
such day-to-day tasks (Szewczyk & Furnell, 2009).
Since the 1960’s psychological research has explored the link between an
individual’s attitude and their subsequent behaviour (Ajzen, 1980; Eagly &
Chaiken, 1993). A positive attitude towards a given subject has been shown to
result in a positive, proactive behaviour towards that same subject matter.
Therefore, should an end-user have a positive experience and attitude in
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configuring an ADSL router, or security software, this should result in a positive,
and ongoing interest in ensuring the product operates correctly. However, endusers who attempt to configure and secure their home networking products
themselves perceive it as an unpleasant, difficult and a time consuming
experience generally blaming product manuals, quick start guides, and after sales
support (Szewczyk, 2006).
To initiate the security research into end-user attitudes and perceptions, an online
survey was created and deployed targeting novice end-users (Szewczyk, 2006).
Respondents were encouraged to only attempt the survey if they felt they were
inexperienced in computing. The anonymous survey was completed by 163
respondents and showed that over 75% felt unsafe when using the Internet. Many
knew that online dangers existed, but could not specifically name or identify any
potential threats moreover, thirty percent of respondents claimed that they applied
appropriate safeguards to their ADSL router. Factors such as access point
placement, and adjusting signal strength were beyond the comprehension of many
respondents, with most end-users utilising trial-and-error approaches to
successfully configure their ADSL router.
The survey allowed a large sample of responses and was complemented by faceto-face interviews with 23 novice end-users during 2009. The 23 individuals were
selected based on their self-confessed skill level in security and computing. The
aim was to better understand end-users perceptions and attitudes towards their
security and privacy when using the Internet (Szewczyk & Furnell, 2009). Most
respondents generally felt unsafe when conducting financial transactions online,
but felt that they had no other choice. Some felt that large corporations were
deciding how and where money could be accessed. Many banks for instance will
offer a small additional interest rate on a savings account which can only be
accessed via that bank’s website. Interviewees often felt alone when requiring
help with such security. Respondents were questioned on where they would
acquire support from when needing assistance in relation to security. Most
respondents (20) stated that they would seek support from ISP employees. The
prominent reason for this was that the respondents felt that ISP employees were
actually trained, and had the expertise to provide reliable and trustworthy advice
and guidance on computer and network security.
Individual perceptions as to whether users would ever be targeted online by
criminals varied considerably, with many perceiving that their financial status will
be influential. This in-turn influenced how much security will be applied to their
computer system. Many respondents believed that a criminal would purposefully
avoid attacking the computer of an individual with a lower financial income
(Szewczyk & Furnell, 2009).
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Naive individuals may not only be targeted online by criminals, but by staff who
opportunistically seek sales. One interviewee claimed that they took their wireless
ADSL router to a computer store and were sold another device, with no wireless
antenna, yet the wireless functionality can be disabled effortlessly on all ADSL
devices. A lack of awareness and miscommunication between a novice user and a
salesperson could frequently result in poor outcomes. For instance, many
interviewees saw anti-virus software as a preventative solution. However, many
respondents believe that the only viable solution to a computer that is infected
with malware was to replace the hard drive with a new one. This misconception is
not surprising, in that many retail outlets, who remove malware from a computer,
use terminology suggesting that a new hard drive and software are being installed.
The current attitudes and perceptions of many end-users towards security are
flawed from a security perspective. End-users must understand that they can be a
target regardless of their financial income or sensitivity of information on their
computer. For those in the workforce, some individuals may be provided with
Security Education, Training and Awareness (SETA) courses at their place of
employment, which then can be passed on and applied in their home environment.
Current research has shown that senior citizens are enthusiastic in attending
training and education seminars (Cook, Szewczyk, & Sansurooah, 2011). Initial
surveys showed that many senior citizens increased their understanding of
security risks considerably following simple dissemination of online threats and
solutions. The key to increasing awareness is making the content enjoyable,
appropriate for the given audience, and most importantly, simple to comprehend.
Television media does discuss wireless threats (Seymour, 2010), but generally
does so in a complicated manner. For instance television media showing criminals
using the BackTrack Linux Distributions (BackTrack, 2012) may not only further
confuse the audience, but may also leave them thinking that such an attack may
never target them, only occurring in science fiction movies.
4. SECURITY LITERATURE
End-users’ perceptions of computer and network security and the associated
threats were shown to be inaccurate and their understanding of how to secure an
ADSL router and wireless network more questionable. Each ADSL router is
operational out of the box. At most, the end-user will need to run a software
wizard, or utilise the provided CD to appropriately configure the device. The
research indicated that many users struggled to apply the appropriate safeguards,
and often blamed the product literature. In the online survey of 163 individuals,
87% stated that they had difficulty interpreting and applying the installation
procedures.
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Information technology manuals should theoretically present end-users, who have
varying technical competencies, with simple and effective instructions on how to
install and secure the given device. Wieringa, Moore and Barnes (1993) suggest
that a well-designed and usable manual will include; a well written set of
procedures, information on the most effective way of completing a task, and be
suitable for both a skilled and novice user. Perelman, Paradis and Barret (1998)
assert that five criteria should be embedded in all high quality procedural
literature. A technical manual should have or use:
1. A well designed index page for quickly locating desirable information
quickly;
2. Descriptive page headers and a table of contents;
3. An outline of the reasons for its creation, the intended audience, and
required level of expertise;
4. A detailed glossary to elaborate on uncommon terminology; and
5. Numerous, large, labelled graphics, clearly depicting each step in the
procedure.
The way in which procedures are written and presented by vendors may
significantly impact their interpretation. End-users placing the blame on poorly
written manuals could be correct or they were not willing to follow the
instructions. From 2005 through to 2011, 17 manuals were examined from the
leading manufacturers of ADSL routers in Australia (Andersson & Szewczyk,
2011; Szewczyk & Valli, 2009). Informative content to setup and secure the
device was undeniably present within the manuals; however, the manner in which
it was presented was questionable, which could leave an end-users confused.
Since the initial examination of ADSL router manuals in 2005, little has improved
through to 2011 (Szewczyk & Valli, 2009). As portrayed through Table 1, many
manuals do not encompass many of the essential elements to ensure that the
product manual is usable. The most important element being the index page has
been omitted from the majority of manuals. The computing industry uses a
copious amount of technical language thus a glossary could easily be used to
explain complicated terminology. Unfortunately less than fifty percent of the
manuals examined incorporated this feature. Many computing words have
become mainstream, but for those with little understanding, the terms Wired
Equivalent Privacy (WEP) or Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) may have little
meaning in the context of novice end-user security.
The procedures and graphics are a separate and complicated issue. In many
instances the graphics are on a small scale and difficult to interpret. Coupled with
the issue of manuals referring to firmware version 1.x, yet the device
encompassing firmware version 2.x creates another dilemma in that the interface
and functions are usually entirely different. Not only does this leave the end-user
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stranded, but any future updates to the firmware and its associated interface will
only further make the manual entirely redundant for a novice end-user. Aside
from a security perspective, vendors do not adequately encourage the use of
security. For advanced end-users who know which security features should be
used, the process of following the procedures may seem simple. However, for the
novice end-user who bases their judgements on the recommendations provided by
the vendors, this creates an entirely new issue. As shown through Table 1 only
Netgear continued to encourage and recommend that specific security features be
implemented. Many vendors would unfortunately stipulate what security features
are available without justifying their use or benefits. This is problematic in that an
end-user has little motivation to update the firmware if for instance they are
unaware of the protection it may provide from embedded malware.
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Intended
Audience

Graphic
Captions

Clear
Graphics

Glossary

Index Page

Contents
Page

Page
Headers

ADSL
Routers

Criteria

Table 1 Comparison and Contrast of Product Literature Design

Billion 7202
D-Link G604T Gen
1

2005

Motorola SBG900
NetComm
NB5PlusW
Netgear DG834G
Siemens 6520
Belkin
F5D7633au4A

2009

D-Link G604T Gen
II
NetComm
NB5PlusW
Netgear DG834g
V5
TP-Link TDW8901G
Billion 7800N
Netgear DGN 1000

2011

D-Link DSL2740B
Netcomm NB6
TP-Link TDW8151N
Belkin F7D1401

The adoption of a broadband internet connection will presumably continue to
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increase. The ADSL router provides a simple yet effective security solution at the
entry point to a home or commercial network. For instance, the manufacturer
Quality Network Appliance Provider (QNAP) incorporates a feature within its
devices which notifies the end-user when a firmware update is available. This is
achieved via a notification window when the end-user logs in to configure the
device. End-users may unfortunately follow a "setup-and-forget" approach
meaning there is no reason to access the configuration options on a regular basis.
Subsequently, manufacturers should incorporate simple software on the already
included configuration media which checks and downloads any appropriate
updates to the ADSL router should it become available – similar to anti-virus
software. There is enough deterrence with updating firmware as it is, with many
manufacturers including numerous warnings regarding how the device may
become damaged with an inappropriate firmware upgrade. A streamline approach
may not only ensure an end-users safety online, but also remove any unnecessary
confusion presented to the end-user.
5. INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDERS AND INSECURITY
The research interviews and surveys described above identified that many
respondents re-iterated their perception of employees, working within Internet
Service Internet Providers (ISPs), as being experts in computer and network
security (Szewczyk, 2006; Szewczyk & Furnell, 2009) yet such employees are
not necessarily employed to provide guidance or advice on security. Furthermore,
the role of an employee working on a help desk may attract an inexperienced
individual, who may rely on opinion on computing and security. However, ISP
employees are perceived as a convenient, 24 hour, 7 days a week source of
advice. To evaluate the quality of advice provided by ISP staff, the research
utilised a deceptive interview approach, whereby the researcher mimicked a
novice end-user over the telephone (Szewczyk, 2010). Seven of the largest ISPs
in Australia were contacted over a three month period and questioned over
methods for both securing an ADSL router, and a computer.
Unsurprisingly, whilst novice end-users may perceive ISP employees as experts,
their guidance and recommendations were far from ideal from a security
viewpoint when compared to current industry recommendations and best
practices (Goodrich & Tamassia, 2011; Nahorney, 2009). When the issue of
securing an ADSL router were raised, ISP staff would either direct the researcher
towards the product manual, the ISP’s website, or in one instance provide a very
invalid response by stating that “ADSL routers do not have security settings”
(Szewczyk, 2010). Clearly, the manual itself lacks readability and encouragement
for the end-user. However, to claim that the device has no security functionality
may clearly endanger an end-user.
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The employees at times did provide realistic and ideal responses, yet many
continued to provide erroneous responses. When questioned over recommended
wireless or computer security options, opinion, rather than fact began to emerge.
Many ISP employees continued to re-iterate that WEP was the ideal wireless
security setting, whilst others would direct the researcher to utilising information
found on the ISP website, or towards Google – with no clear indication as to what
terms should be searched for. In terms of computer security advice, the employees
were more skilled when recommending that a personal firewall and anti-virus
software be installed. Two employees, from two ISP were unhelpful and unaware,
stating that Windows 7 is secure out-of-the-box and does not need any additional
modification. In one instance, the employee stated that the local computer store
should be approached for advice and recommendations on which software would
be more suitable.
The results of the survey indicate that the employees within ISPs, whilst being
somewhat helpful, did not possess the knowledge or skill set required to suitably
advise customers seeking help when compared industry best practices for
safeguarding a computer or ADSL router. Whilst there is not just one solution to
a particular security issue, there are at least ideal answers which could have been
provided. An additional outcome amongst the feedback provided by employees
was that of the content located on their website. Many employees re-iterated that
there was an abundance of information on the ISP website which detailed best
practices for ensuring that a computer, network and ADSL router are secured
appropriately.
From the information reviewed, no-where amongst help pages or contact
information provided by Australian ISPs does it state that it is the job of the help
desk employees to provide security advice. This could be a positive characteristic
because it reduces the amount of training that employees needed to function in
their role. Being an entry level position in the IT industry, many help desk
employees would be beginning their career at such a premise. So why then, do the
employees take it upon themselves to not only provide advice on security related
matters, but more seriously provide incorrect recommendations? Whilst these
employees may feel the need to help those seeking guidance, in many instances
they have been identified as providing inappropriate advice. In the majority of
instances, the end-user seeking guidance would have been additionally vulnerable
to internet based attacks. An ISP needs to train staff appropriately to handle such
incidents where a customer seeks guidance. Alternatively, employees within an
ISP need to be directed that they do not provide any security related guidance.
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6. UNUSABLE ONLINE INFORMATION
ISP employees encouraged customers to utilise the security information on their
website. In most occurrences the employees were unable to direct the customer to
the exact location of the information. Empirical investigations conducted by Tan
and Wei (2006) demonstrated that a well-structured website will facilitate endusers in locating desirable information and accomplishing their goals. Hence,
security information on each ISP website should be easily located and designed in
a manner which will permit the end-user to navigate to the required sections.
More importantly, the website should attract an end-user into the security section
so that security can be applied or reviewed if it hasn’t already been done so.
Eleven websites of ISPs in Australia were examined for their accessibility,
currency, and accuracy of security related content (Szewczyk, 2010).
Unfortunately, only two ISPs had content which was easily accessible, simple to
locate, and relevant for the time period, equipment and operating systems
currently utilised.
There are numerous issues which emerged from the examination of ISP based
online security information. In some instances, even though Windows 7 has been
available for a considerable period of time, many were still referring to, and
showing step-by-step instructions for Windows 98 or Windows XP.
Subsequently, in some instances an ISP would demonstrate how to install a
specific piece of software (personal firewall, or anti-virus software), although
would be showing a product which is outdated by three to five years. Locating
security related information on many of the ISP websites was almost impossible.
As demonstrated in Figure 2 and 3, a search for “wireless security” can yield
entirely diverse results. One ISP has results which related to the purchase of
wireless based products from within their online shopping portal, whilst the
second ISP did actually yield correct and appropriate results.
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Figure 2 Bigpond Search Results for Wireless Security
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Figure 3 Westnet Search Results for Wireless Security
Two of the eleven ISPs examined encompassed security information which was
easily accessible, current and accurate. These two ISPs – iinet and Westnet are
generally targeted towards heavy internet users or those individuals who could be
perceived as IT professionals and enthusiasts. However, large Australian ISPs
such as Bigpond or Optus who are generally utilised by novice and leisurely endusers did not encompass any usable security information. This is ironic in that it is
these novice end-users who would usually require the most support and guidance
when utilising the Internet, rather than being sold products that they have no real
use for.
A significant issue amongst the security related information of the remaining
seven ISPs was that of how the information is actually presented. It is of no
benefit to an end-user to state that an ADSL router password should be changed –
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if there is no recommendation on good password practices, or details as to how
the password should actually be changed. Many ISPs also shifted the security on
Internet Security Suites, as an all in one solution for mitigating any internet
related threats. On the other hand, Bigpond and Optus, were not only using scare
tactics but also marketing their own proprietary security software as a world
market leader according to their own independent studies. These products were
relatively expensive, claimed to be top of the range, and discouraged the use of
freely available security software. There are many freely available software
packages available which provide reasonable online protection, yet many ISPs
would negate the quality of the freely available software.
It is not surprising that many ISP employees were unable to direct the research
towards the security information on the ISP website, seeing that in most instances,
the information did not actually exist. There are eleven prominent ISPs in
Australia, yet only two of these emphasise security and privacy to its customers.
The information on many of these websites needs to be regularly updated and
easily accessible. In addition ISPs need to focus on showing freely available
products to their customers as a means of securing their computer as this may not
only protect the end-user, but may also prevent potential attack on the ISP or its
other customers.
7. SECURITY SOFTWARE USABILITY
The security information supplied by ISPs on their website was generally
outdated and difficult to locate, and in most instances did not adhere to good
website design practices (Tan & Wei, 2006). However, many of the statements
did encourage the use of security software. Whilst traditional security software
made use of a personal firewall and a separate anti-virus program, many vendors
today are integrating each of these elements into an Internet Security Suite. There
is also a trend with vendors marketing their products as usable, easy-to-use, and
simple. ZoneAlarm’s Product Manager Jordy Berson (2005) claims – even his
parents could utilise his product. The usability of security software has been a
long standing issue. In 1975 it was identified that end-users would fail to adopt
security systems unless they were easy to use (Saltzer & Schroeder, 1975). In the
paper “Why Johnny Can’t Encrypt” (Whitten & Tygar, 1999) the researchers
identified that with a well-designed interface, participants in their study were still
unable to use the software effectively. Retail outlets and ISPs are encouraging
end-users to utilise Internet Security Software. This initiated the question of how
usable are the available Internet Security Suites.
The top ten Internet Security Suites were acquired and evaluated for their
responses and subsequent usability – when presented with current malware, recent
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phishing sites, and penetration testing network scans (Szewczyk, 2011). Welldesigned Internet Security Suites can play an important role in both protecting and
educating end-users. Should an end-user visit a malicious website, the software
may either block the website, or block and educate the end-user as to why the
website could be malicious. Many personal firewalls will react and notify the enduser if a service is attempting to access the Internet. An unrecognisable service
name has little merit in helping the end-user decide if they should allow or deny
the service, or internet access. Meaningful explanations coupled with the potential
risks of permitting the service to access the Internet have significant advantages in
allowing the end-user to make the correct decision.
Many of the Internet Security Suites incorporated elements which would deter or
prevent a novice end-user from protecting themselves effectively. Kaspersky
raised a notification on the bottom of the browser stating “dangerous URL”. It did
not provide any further information, or explain what a URL is, potentially leaving
an end-user confused with how to proceed. Alternatively eScan would block a
phishing website with text stating “Access Denied” followed by “Suspected
Phishing Site”, without a definition or possible consequences should an end-user
proceed. In a similar manner Bit Defender presented the user with “The webpage
has been blocked” because it “included objects that were infected”, providing
little information as to what an object is, or where it originated. There is little
merit from the end-users perspective, for security software to block access to a
website, without any justification. If a potential threat is detected, it would be
appropriate for the security product to provide a brief outline of why the website
has been blocked, dangers associated with the website, and a recommendation on
how to proceed.
The guidance provided with relation to dealing with malware appears to be an
overlooked task by vendors. Mimicking the process of an end-user downloading a
malicious file - a malware specimen was placed on the desktop of the test
workstation. Bit Defender, Eset, and Norton, immediately block access to the
binary. No explanation was provided as to why the file was inaccessible; instead
an alert was raised informing the end-user of a virus. Norton in particular would
not permit the file to be deleted. In every instance that an attempt was made to
delete the file, Norton would alert that a threat was present, and that file was
inaccessible. However, once a system virus scan was initiated, the file was
removed. Such a process is not only confusing and complicated for a novice enduser, but also does not clearly provide step-by-step instruction as to what needs to
be undertaken to remove the threat.
One of the prevalent outcomes of the experiment was how little control an enduser has once a workstation is infected with malware. Software alerts are
generated notifying of the threat. However, the end-user is predominantly
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instructed to click through a series of acceptances to initiate a scan or to agree in
removing the malware specimen, in technical uninformative instructions. Trend
Micro, and ZoneAlarm did raise an alert of a potential virus when accessing the
website containing the malware specimen. This fortunately did permit the user to
agree or disagree in downloading the potential threat to their system. Whilst an
explanation of the threat was raised, no recommendations were generated as to
whether or not the user should continue with the download or omit it entirely.
Security software usability will always be an ongoing issue. However, vendors do
have the options to simplify the decision making process and even educate the
end-user as to what could happen if a certain option is chosen. The term virus has
become mainstream throughout the years, so anytime the word virus appears; this
should come across as dangerous to the end user. However, other controls are
more technical and require advance knowledge, or further education before any
decision can be made. When a Windows service requires access to the Internet,
the firewall will stipulate the process name that requires access. These process
names can be quite meaningless. However, the process could be an anti-virus
software requiring access to update its signatures, or a malicious host attempting
to access the workstation.
8. EDUCATION AS A SOLUTION
The fundamental criteria for helping end-users use security effectively is
education. Senior citizens are perhaps most impacted by having to undertake in
many online activities, yet a simple education program designed to explain
security concepts has shown success in early trials (Cook, Szewczyk, &
Sansurooah, 2011). In a similar manner that a child learns mathematics and
languages in primary school, end-users must learn security techniques and best
practices from the ground up. A group of senior citizens were told how and why a
criminal may want to send phishing scams via email. A collection of legitimate
and phishing emails were then shown to the group with a greater emphasis placed
on the emails that were misleading. The group was shown step-by-step how to
identify phishing emails, and within a short space of time were able to confidently
identify fraudulent emails themselves.
Applying this method to online, security information portals; product manuals;
and security software may successfully improve end-users’ awareness and
understanding of online threats. The predominant flaw amongst all information
sources was assumed prior knowledge, which end-users usually do not have. For
instance, if security software has an option to enable phishing detection, an enduser may disregard this if they are unfamiliar with its purpose. In the context of
wireless network, vendors could outline the potential consequences of using a
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wireless network and complement these with step-by-step solutions to mitigate
each of the risks. Internet Security Suites are flawed in a similar manner, in that
end-users may not necessarily know which feature should be enabled on a
personal firewall or anti-virus software. However, providing a “ground-up”
tutorial on common threats, and how the software can mitigate these, may educate
the end-user, and act as a selling point for the software provider.
9. CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that end-users must protect themselves online, but the question
remains who should be initiate this task. End-users are constantly presented with
new challenges in the online world. The media has raised concerns over the
Facebook timeline feature, showing end-users how to implement privacy settings
on their account (Jacobsson, 2012). However, no where does it actually stipulate
specific dangers if this is not adequately secured. Subsequently, end-users must be
made more aware of the risks if proper action is not taken, but it must be
explained using a jargon free, non-technical language.
This research has been undertaken over a six year timeframe to determine if using
security is in fact a difficult task or if end-users are at fault when becoming a
victim to an Internet based attack. Each research project emerged from a prevalent
outcome from the previous research project. The research suggests that there are
in fact many factors which could potentially deter or prevent an end-user from
being secured. Security will never be adopted and usable by end-users if vendors
continue to develop products without novice end-users as a part of the design
process. ISPs are currently perceived by novice end-users as a reliable source of
information, yet the deceptive study showed that the advice could have been
improved upon significantly. In Australia, there is no call centre for end-users to
communicate with an expert in cyber security. As a result, ISPs could take it upon
themselves in providing security support to its customers.
Academics, commercial organisations, and governments have all attempted to
help end-users use security effectively. Future research will focus on formulating
and testing methods to educate novice end-users on the ways to implement, use
and understand cyber security. This is vitally important in that technology is
evolving at a rapid pace and is in-turn allowing criminals to exploit and develop
threats for devices beyond the traditional PC. Subsequently end-users must have
the appropriate educational material to protect themselves from future online
dangers.
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